orgtheory.net

Omar

The lead article in the latest issue of Psychological Review deals with the effects of social isolation on mental health. Just kidding. The article, written by E. Tory Higgins, deals with an issue that has come up a couple of times in orgtheory, naturally enough, since it is one of Brayden’s many research interests: the question of where value comes from. The paper is really interesting, insofar as it tries to move beyond the traditional conception as value emerging solely from what the author refers to as the “hedonic” properties of the object (good/bad, pretty/ugly, pleasurable/painful), by isolating a second dimension of value creation (partially orthogonal to how desirable or undesirable the target is): strength of engagement. The author summarizes the argument as follows:

Value is an experience of strength of motivational force. It is an experience of how intensely one is attracted to or repulsed from something. I have proposed that the value experience derives not only from hedonic experience but also from the strength of the motivational force experience of wanting to make something attractive happen or something repulsive not happen. The intensity of the motivational force experience, in turn, is influenced by strength of engagement. Although the subjective properties of a value target are an important determinant of engagement strength, they are not the only determinant. Factors separate from the value target’s properties also influence strength of engagement and thus contribute to the intensity of attraction or repulsion. Because their contribution to value creation runs through engagement strength to experienced motivational intensity, these additional factors can intensify either attraction or repulsion regardless of whether they themselves are pleasant or unpleasant situations.

The argument is interesting in various respects, not the least of which is that it synthesizes a ton of research in psychology, both classic and contemporary, from the early field theory of Lewin and Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory. It also proposes various (and somewhat counterintuitive propositions), all deduced from the basic theoretical proposition that if something positively affects the extent to which we become engrossed or deeply engaged in the pursuit of a goal then the target will become more valuable to us, regardless of the target’s initial subjective value properties and regardless of how pleasurable/unpleasurable the efforts to secure the valued object are.

Thus various clever experimental setups that are designed to affect engagement strength also show that the value of the object pursued increases with strength of engagement. Among some of the factors that have been shown to affect engagement are: 1) encountering opposition by external forces, here being blocked from the goal (but not so seriously hampered as to discourage us) makes us want the valued object even more, the classic Romeo and Juliette effect. 2) Overcoming personal resistance to a task (a subjective version of conquering an external obstacle) such that when getting something that we want requires us to exercise some self control or ignore a distraction, then the object becomes more valuable to us and 3) something that is very important for organizational theorists: legitimacy. Experimental studies show than when subjects perceive that they are choosing something or pursuing a goal using what are considered the “proper” means, the value of the object increases.

Notice that all of these propositions also apply to unpleasurable experiences, only that they become even more repulsive, when we are actively engaged in avoiding them (which explains for instance why snobbery [against mass culture, Starbucks, you name it] is a virtuous circle, with active engagement in snobbish avoidance increasing the dislike for the object). Finally, arousing emotions (whether positive or negative as arousal [or activity] is a dimension of emotional experience orthogonal to positive/negative valence) and the emotional energy or buzz that comes from interacting with others also increases the perceived value of objects pursued (or negative value of objects avoided) because it increases strength of engagement. This is consistent with recent research by Wayne Baker and collaborators at Michigan on positive energy in organizations and value creation.

Also being deeply engaged in pursuing something that was initially considered negative, may reduce the negativity of the target, which is the classic dissonance effect, only that here strength of engagement is the key variable not the cognitive inconsistency between values and behavior. Also pursuing something that was initially valuable in a half-assed manner (with little strength) reduces the value of the goal. This is a nice an theoretically elegant way to think of the endogeneity of preferences and the pursuit of those preferences, something that has been pointed by Elster as the “sour grapes” effects, but which has remained somewhat underdeveloped.

This paper made me think of a new explanation for a part of Weber’s Protestant Ethic that is hard to understand. The connection between Calvinist predestination and valuing work for its own sake. I never fully understood the theoretical mechanism (why didn’t the Puritans get discouraged and became fatalists?) but the Higgins model explains it: insofar as the insecurity brought about by your uncertain status in the afterlife increased strength of engagement in work, it also increased the value of toil, even if the hedonic properties of working remained negative (they didn’t actually liked to work, they just did it).