beliefs and knockdown arguments
Teppo
It can be frustrating to try to push an argument that seems logically true, specifically when others dismiss the argument outright, for no good reason. As Nozick notes – in over-the-top fashion – the problem is the lack of penalties:
. . . The penalty philosophers wield is, after all, rather weak. If the other person is willing to bear the label of “irrational” or “having the worse arguments”, he can skip away happily maintaining his previous belief. He will be trailed, of course, by the philosopher furiously hurling philosophical imprecations: “What do you mean, you’re willing to be irrational? You shouldn’t be irrational because . . . ” And although the philosopher is embarrassed by his inability to complete this sentence in a noncircular fashion–he can only produce reasons for accepting reasons–still, he is unwilling to let his adversary go.
Wouldn’t it be better if philosophical arguments left the person no possible answer at all, reducing him to impotent silence? Even then, he might sit there silently, smiling, Buddha-like. Perhaps philosophers need arguments so powerful they set up reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the conclusion, he dies. How’s that for a powerful argument? Yet, as with other physical threats (”your money or your life”), he can choose defiance. A “perfect” philosophical argument would leave no choice.
Kuhn of course solved all that.
