is constructivism dangerous?
Saku
Have been reading Paul Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge, a compelling and intelligent refutation of Social Constructivism. I regard myself as a social constructivist within my own domain of work, as many of the micro-organizational phenomena which I am interested in would seem to be epistemologically relative. Who would have the guts to argue that he/she knows what the culture of Organization X is, for instance. Joanna Martin, in her classic text Cultures in Organizations, shows how you can give multiple readings of the culture of a single firm, none of which is non-contestable. Boghossian, originally physics major, who used to sit in Rorty’s seminar, makes a powerful argument which is a pleasure to read (by the way, Boghossian has also written an illuminative essay on the Sokal controversy in the Times Literary Supplement, which can be accessed here).
Boghossian builds his general examination on what he calls the “principle of equal validity” (p. 2):
“[...] the idea that there are “many equally valid ways of knowing the world,” with science being just one of them, has taken very deep root [...] I shall call it (as neutrally as possible) the doctrine of
Equal Validity:
There are many radically different, yet “equally valid” ways of knowing the world, with science being just one of them”
Furthermore, epistemological constructivism has three (interrelated) forms (p. 22):
“Constructivism about Knowledge:
Constructivism about Facts: The world which we seek to understand and know about is not what it is independently of us and our social context; rather, all facts are socially constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests.
Constructivism about Justification:
Facts of the form – information E justifies belief B – are not what they are independently of us and our social context; rather, all such facts are constructed in a way that reflects our contingent needs and interests.
Constructivism about Rational Explanation: It is never possible to explain why we believe what we believe solely on the basis of our exposure to the relevant evidence; our contingent needs and interests must also be invoked.”
Boghossian carefully builds arguments to refute all forms of constructivism. At the end of the book, he argues that while constructivism has been regarded as a source of social progression, as it allows voice for alternative, marginalized voices. He refutes this view by essentially claiming that “the truth shall set you free” (p. 130): if the powerful can’t criticize the oppressed, because the central epistemological categories are inexorably tied to particular perspectives, it also allows that the oppressed can’t criticize the powerful.”
In the final argument, I am reminded by Alvesson & Willmott’s (1992) paper in AMR, where they defend the possibility of emancipation in organization studies against poststructuralist critique. Indeed, it would appear that to be able to really defend the weak or the oppressed, the project for which many constructivists no doubt have sympathy for, we are in need of some (non-political) ontological bedrock.
What I wonder about Boghossian’s formulation, however, is whether he is actually setting up a straw man in his portrayal of constructivism. More precisely, how many of us who regard themselves to be constructivists, actually adopt the principle of “equal validity?” I would personally go for a sceptical solution (as in Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language) and argue that there is no non-social way of deciding between ways of knowing the world. This is not to say that the views are equally valid. I am willing to say in a positive sense that epistemic justification is socially conditioned (those of you who wish to find counterarguments for this, refer to Boghossian’s chapters 5-6). As I have not seen any non-social way of justifying beliefs, this is what I have to take for granted. However, to move from this (descriptive) belief into a normative belief about all ways of knowing being equally valid seems to me to ignore Hume’s guilliotine.
In our field, where managerial and scholarly language games are intrically intertwined (see Mauws & Phillips in Org Science, 1995), we constantly encounter striking examples of our conceptual schemas being driven by political interests. Nietzsche managed to sum up this relation between language and politics in a compelling manner:
“The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it. To the extent that man has for long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates he has appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world.” (Nietzsche, 1878/1996: 16.)
Saku: There’s a great book by (eds.) Hollis and Lukes (1982) which nicely explicates both sides of the argument. The book is titled Rationality and Relativism and it has chapters by Barnes and Bloor, Hollis (the Hollis chapter actually appears very similar to the Boghossian framing – he works through a dozen or so different types of relativism), Elster, Gellner, Hacking, etc.
tf
December 4, 2007 at 4:10 pm
“there is no non-social way of justifying beliefs”
OK, man falls off cliff, man dies. Do I need a committee to tell me that it’s not a good idea to fall off cliffs?
Ontology: Is there really a cliff?
Epistemology: How do I know there is a cliff?
Scepticism: I’m not really sure there is a cliff
Constructivism: It could be a cliff…or it could be a banana
Pragmatism: Avoid falling off cliffs.
stevphel
December 4, 2007 at 5:43 pm
P.S. Constructivism is a dead end for progressives.
One of my favorite articles was “Common Ground: Finding our way back to the Enlightenment” by Thomas de Zengotita in Harper’s Magazine 2003. An audio link is http://www.assistivemedia.org/mp3/CommonGround.mp3
He concludes: “put down your Foucault, take up your Voltaire”
stevphel
December 4, 2007 at 5:52 pm
stevphel’s comment reminds me of a fascinating essay I read several years ago in Reconsidering Social Constructionism. The author, a philosopher or historian of science (as I recall) named Hazelrigg, gives a very insightful analysis of constructionism but then concludes with a sort of Kantian irony that human beings seem to feel lost at sea if they can’t hang on to facts for which they feel absolutely no responsibility (i.e., production). Thus, when faced with the logic of constructionism (which is basically an offshoot of Kant), they quickly retort about stubbing toes on rocks–or in his example, bones that we dig out of the ground. Being reminded of it, I need to go back and read that essay again. I recommend it to others. Just don’t miss the delicious irony at the end (I think the people who edited the book did miss the irony, for they seem to think the author was an old-fashioned champion of representationalism.
ezra hill
December 5, 2007 at 11:56 am
Hazelrigg “Constructionism and the Practices of Objectivity”
in Reconsidering Social Constructionism
Debates in Social Problems Theory
James A Holstein, Editor
Gale Miller, Editor
ISBN: 978-0-202-30864-7
Publication Date: 2006
stevphel
December 5, 2007 at 6:10 pm
‘More precisely, how many of us who regard themselves to be constructivists, actually adopt the principle of “equal validity?”’
None. Perhaps a few guys in a Critical Lit Studies department.
That’s probably why writing that Bhog. is a good critic of soc. constructivists is wrong. Change it?
phnk
December 6, 2007 at 11:17 pm
phnk: so if 99% of your society believes that man is a divine creation or that the earth is flat or that the earth goes round the sun does that make it a true/valid belief?
More people today believe in creationism than evolution – does that make it a valid belief?
This is the slippery slope of relativism.
stevphel
December 7, 2007 at 1:30 am
Let’s assume (1) that creationists believe that their creationist belief is the truth, and (2) that evolutionists believe that their evolutionist belief is the truth. (I don’t know that all members of either camp are so described accurately; for the sake of argument, let’s assume that they are.) The two camps can ignore each other, or they can engage in conversation, each trying to convince the other of the basic error of their belief. Now, a very old trick is to usurp the ground of authority. If I can get my opponent to accept that I know the truth outside of, independent of, my belief and the belief of anyone else, I’ve gained control of the conversation, and the debate is over insofar as that degree of acceptance. For some conversants, for example, the trick might be turned by convincing all that I have a direct pipeline to their (“our”) God and perfectly hear and understand God’s truth. For other conversants, substitute for “God” “the bare facts” or “thing in itself” or some such formulation—the crucial point being that whatever otherwise the character of that truth-giving source, it is wholly independent of, external to, and logically prior to, any human belief about anything (except, of course, that in order for the trick to work the conversants have to believe all that has just been said about that truth-giving source).
About “equally valid,” by the way: it’s a mostly vacuous idea. Conversations, debates, etc., take place within existing inequalities of resource (including intellectual resource) and are strongly influenced by them.
As an engineer, I have studied a variety of slippery slopes. The bogeyman of relativism doesn’t qualify.
ezra hill
December 7, 2007 at 4:15 pm
stevphel:
Sorry, but
1- relativism has nothing to do with the questions you are asking.
2- my comment has nothing to do with the questions you are asking.
Re-stating my initial comment:
I am saying the equal validity thesis exists only in a few obtuse minds. For Paul Bhog. to claim he is criticising relativism by addressing this microscopic and marginal community is an intellectual insult to the people he quotes as ‘equal validators’ (most of them are not), as well as an embarrassment for himself: if he really thinks the equal validity pervades relativism, then his reading skills are obviously low.
In short, Paul Bhog. is attacking a position that is mostly th fruit of his imagination. This makes him a very bad critic of what is actually being said by relativists.
Now turning to your questions:
The answer is no, but just like ezra, I see no link with either relativism or slippery slopes. Do you think relativists consider majoritarian opinions to be systematically true?
phnk
December 8, 2007 at 1:03 am
Sigh, I fully got your point, phnk.
For the record, Ezra, I understand and agree that “appeals to authority” are made all the time and that there is benefit in exposing them.
For all the engineers out there (and phnk) let me explain what relativism and slippery slopes have to do with equal validity.
Actually, Ezra provides the key: “Ezra says: “whatever otherwise the character of that truth-giving source, it is wholly independent of, external to, and logically prior to, any human belief about anything”.
Ezra, answer me this, is any truth-giving source VALID? By this, I mean, are people justified in believing something to be true because of the validity of the truth-giving source. I would argue they can – see post above on falling off cliffs. But what if you argue they cannot. Then you have no basis for determining the validity of one claim from another. Thus, all claims are EQUALLY VALID (or equally invalid). This is the slippery slope of relativism. If you do not think all claims are equally valid then please tell me how you judge the validity of one claim from another?
So, phnk, what has this got to do with creationism? Of course I don’t think relativists consider majoritarian opinions to be systematically true – that is my whole point. Relativists have no way of determining the validity of one claim from another. Not by facts, not by majority, not by anything. You might as well take a vote to guide collective action – unless you have a better system – ideal speech situation perhaps?
Via observation, science discovered the world was round not flat. People have physically left this world and observed it to be round. I have no problem privileging (replicated) observation over other “ways of knowing”.
(And yes, I am fully aware of the literature on the sociology of science and the use of science as an “appeal to authority”).
stevphel
December 8, 2007 at 5:57 pm
It is amazing to see someone speak so much of relativism without obviously knowing anything about it. Who convinced you that relativism is an attitude that consists in negating observed phenomena?
Relativism simply claims that what you call a truth-giving source is never an absolute source of truth. The human condition simply does not permit it. All our observations are subject to our inherent limitations as human beings: they are relative.
The slippery slope is slippery because you are putting soap on it. Read Lukes and Hollis, as well as a few relativist viewpoints. Come back when you have an idea of what the relativist literature is saying.
phnk
December 9, 2007 at 12:39 am
Sure, there are lots of “valid truth-giving sources”; but all of them are internal to one or another human culture and thus are not independent of, external to, or logically prior to human belief. Does that mean that within any one of those cultures claims of validity are all equal? Of course not. You say that you agree that appeals to authority are made all the time and that they should be exposed for what they are. But, stevphel, you want to appeal to the authority of the inert rock, as it is in itself, prior to all human culture. Nice trick, if you can get away with it (and indeed lots of people do).
I can design a slippery slope that you simply cannot gain any traction on, and so you will slide downward the entire length of the designed slope. But, stevphel, the “slippery slope” you are concerned about? On it anyone at any time can stand up and say “Basta!” “Enough!”
ezra hill
December 9, 2007 at 1:10 am
“Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel”, said Samuel Johnson. The second last refuge must be “come back when you have an idea of what the relativist literature is saying”.
Phnk: Lukes and Hollis present several flavors of relativism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) lists 81 versions. Are you incapable of expressing your own position? Your friend Ezra has no problem negating observed phenomena and yet you seem to allow it. Or has Ezra got it wrong, too?
Ezra: “Does that mean that within any one of these cultures claims of validity are all equal? Of course not.” You are setting up a straw man argument with Boghossian and myself. Our critique focuses on validity across cultures.
from SEP: “Normative relativism with respect to central beliefs is the thesis that there is no framework-independent fact about which central beliefs are right, but that such beliefs can be right or wrong relative to a framework. The unqualified claim that any belief, even those that are inconsistent, could be correct relative to some framework or other is too strong to be plausible, but more modest versions of normative relativism about belief are possible. For a belief to be correct is for it to be true, so normative relativism about belief amounts to a normative relativism about truth.”
“There are no cultural relativists at 30,000 feet” – Richard Dawkins.
stevphel
December 10, 2007 at 12:51 pm
Of course there are, Richard. We fly just as you do.
Negating observed phenomena? Sure, people do it all the time. Hmm, I saw the sun come up this morning; oh, but the earth rotates on its axis. Does that difference make any difference to actions I will carry out today? Probably not, not even if I fly to Perth. But, stevphel, you lost me with that sentence about Phnk seeming ” to allow it.”
Validity across cultures? Sure, cultures have tried to impose their standards on each other during all of recorded history. Some have been more aggressive about it than others; some have been more successful in the efforts than others. When reasonably unconstrained conversation between cultures is allowed, some exchange of ideas takes place, and sometimes the exchange results in a new, shared standard or standards. But those standards–call them truths, if you like–are still internal to and relative to the culture(s) of which they are parts.
By the way, stevphel, thanks for the cite of that Hazelrigg paper. I found the book in our library and re-read it. I’m still impressed by the care of the argument, and how subtle it is in places. A gem. It appears, however, that hardly anyone has opened the book. Too bad. What do our students read today? One another’s blog.
Well, I’m on to other pastures. (Or is that “blog”?)
ezra hill
December 10, 2007 at 2:06 pm