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Fabio

From 1972 to 2008, nobody, except party insiders, cared much about the superdelegates. But now that people have closely scrutinized the superdelegate system, it’s clear that the institution is simply a failure. Designed at a low point in Democratic party politics, the superdelegates were instituted to prevent the rise of candidates deemed inappropriate by the party leadership. This institutional design was never tested simply because these party elites have usually jumped on board with the primary contest winner. But now there is a possibility that neither Hillary nor Obama will reach the 2,000+ delegates needed for victory through primary contests alone and people have asked what the superdelegates should do. The superdelegate system’s problems are now clear.

First off, there’s a lot of reasons to believe that the superdelegates will probably go with the primary winner. If people know that you voted against the wishes of the local party, you might be punished in the next election. In this case, the superdelegates don’t add anything to the process. Second, if the superdelegates vote against a primary winner, then they’d probably anger the party and create a crisis of confidence within the party that is not easily mended. Third, if the primary system yeilds an ambiguous result (a three way split, a close delegate tally, or a victory based on disputed delegates), then the decision is thrown to a group whose identity and accountability is not entirely clear to the rank and file. While it may be reasonable to allow elected officials to have a say, it’s harder to justify the votes of the committee chairs or other functionaries. Fourth, even when there are clear winners, superdelegates may generate un-needed animosity by lopsidedly voting for the winner and alienating the loser, which has happened in previous Democratic primaries. These all cast doubt on the wisdon of the superdelegate system.

The most important argument against the superdelegate system is how it increases the volatility of primary process by decreasing the certainty of the outcome. It simply creates a huge, unneeded problem. If the front runner is ahead in pledged delegates, but not enough to dominate the competition, then the other candidates may choose to go the next stage of the process. By competing hard enough to deny an outright victory, a condition created solely by the need to collect more pledged delegates than a majority of superdelegates, the losing candidate creates a situation of great uncertainty, where they can make back stage appeals to party elites. This undermines the usefulness of the normal electoral process, which was to settle the winner.

Superdelegates may have a use. The Democratic party could use them in a fashion analagous to Congress’ role in a presidential election, where Representatives and Senators make the decisions if the Electorial College vote doesn’t produce a winner. If there was a three way tie between Obama, Hillary and Edwards among pledged delegates, then it seems reasonable to allow a jury of party elites pick the winner. But making them part of the normal process and giving them the power to reverse the party electorate is at best useless and at worst a fiasco.