orgtheory.net

the corporation and inequality

This blog post is the third in a blog forum about inequality and organizational theory (see parts 1 and 2).  Adam Cobb of Penn’s Wharton School of Management wrote the post and Leslie McCall of Northwestern University provided commentary.

Adam Cobb

An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.

- Plutarch

Corporations are the essence of inequality. Within them, workers are sorted into pyramid-shaped hierarchies where a privileged few at the top garner disproportionate perks from their status.  Executives benefit from skyrocketing levels of  compensation that are not tightly coupled with sustained company performance, while those at the lower rungs of the firm receive stagnant wages, declining benefits, and less security despite overall increases in labor productivity over the past 30 years.   At first glance, it’s logical to assume that the prevalence of large-scale corporate enterprises in a society would be associated with greater levels of inequality.

One afternoon, Jerry Davis (my recovering advisor and current co-conspirator in this research) and I began thinking about this question in detail.  Jerry had recently finished his book tour for Managed by Markets, which chronicled the decline of the large corporation and concomitant rise of finance as the central institution in US society.  We discussed how income inequality rose during a period when financial markets took an increasingly large role in redefining the purpose of the firm – the corporation was no longer a stabilizing institution providing large numbers of quality jobs, retirement and health care, and opportunities for advancement and mobility.  Could rising income inequality be a consequence these changes?   Our hunch was yes.

Whereas economic theory explains wage differentials to variations in labor supply and productivity, the structuralist approach in sociology argues that organizations are the central source of inequality because firms provide unequal access to remuneration, rewards and opportunities for advancement.  Organizations and their practices, therefore, have much to inform us about societal-levels of income inequality.  How corporate size relates to inequality is because large organizations are more likely to standardize their employment practices through bureaucratized procedures.  They are also more likely to utilize internal labor markets (ILMs) in which workers are buffered from the vagaries of market forces.  ILMs also provide a clear pathway for mobility – jobs are organized into promotion ladders that enable workers to move upward through the corporate ranks.  As more employees are brought within the boundaries of a single organization, their remuneration and opportunities for advancement are standardized.  Extremes at the top and bottom of a country’s income distribution are most likely to occur outside of bureaucratized corporations.  The top end consists of winner-take-all markets, investment partnerships and other boutique firms where the spoils are shared by a relatively small number.  The very bottom is characterized by low wages and economic insecurity.  Workers in large corporations are more likely to occupy the middle.

In a recent study, Jerry and I tested this hypothesis.  We operationalized the presence of large corporations in a society by creating a measure of employment concentration – the proportion of the labor force employed by the largest 10, 25, or 50 firms – and tested whether this has any relationship with a country’s level of inequality.  The results are startling and indicate an almost mechanical relationship between inequality and employment concentration in the US over time

Three-Year Moving Average of Income Inequality and Employment Concentration in the United States, 1950 – 2008

Cross-national results, while less straightforward, are also suggestive.

Cross-National Comparison of Income Inequality and Employment Concentration

The observed pattern indicates a ‘‘wedge’’: low employment concentration is compatible with both great inequality (Latin America) and relative equality (the former state socialist countries), but high concentration seems to drive out inequality. (Preliminary cross-national, longitudinal work suggests that this relationship is equally as strong in the  UK (ρ = -.75) as in the US (ρ = -.81), though much less so in Canada (ρ = -20).) There exist a number of alternative explanations for these findings and while space constraints limit my ability to discuss those here, we do our best to account for those both empirically and conceptually in our paper.

I do not wish to romanticize the halcyon days where large corporations dominated the societal landscape.  However, the results here suggest that a society’s level of corporate employment is negatively associated with inequality.  Future work in this area will help uncover when, where and under what conditions these relationships hold.

[Shameless plug]  Currently, I am developing a website to serve as a portal where researchers can find, access and contribute data and research to the study of this topic.  It should be up soon, so check out http://www.worldinequality.net in the next few weeks!

 

Discussion by Leslie McCall

Organizational sociologists have long studied the relationship between organizations and labor market structures, including labor market inequalities and insecurities of many kinds. Until recently, however, they have been relatively absent from debates over the causes and consequences of rising economic inequality.  No doubt this reflects the difficulties of measuring corporate-level changes in a manner that isolates their unique impact on aggregate levels of economic inequality.

In the absence of such aggregate, organization-level data, scholars interested in understanding the social dynamics of rising inequality have focused on the impact of changes in families, unions, the minimum wage, partisan shifts, tax policy, and other major social and political institutions. I come back to politics at the end, but for the moment I simply want to emphasize that economists and political scientists already recognize that institutional factors are important in shaping the rise of earnings and income inequality. Current debates revolve around which institutions matter the most, and when and why they do, as the trend in rising inequality varies considerably over time and depending on the measure of inequality (e.g., earnings inequality versus family income inequality, the 50th/10th ratio versus the share of income held by the top .01%).

It is especially in this light that Davis and Cobb’s research is so welcome, given its international and historical scope. If they can help explain both the ups in the 1980s and the downs in the 1960s in the U.S., in addition to cross-national variation, that would be impressive indeed. The considerable empirical evidence they harness does suggest that employment concentration in large firms is associated with income inequality. And so this—employment concentration— might represent one of the best ways that organizational sociologists can begin to measure organizational change and its connection to aggregate inequality.

In the spirit of furthering this broader project, I want to say a bit more about Davis and Cobb’s findings, their explanations of these findings, and how their research squares with the research of a small but hopefully growing number of other sociologists studying the impact of corporate structure on inequality (and here I focus mainly on the U.S.).

First, in terms of the findings, the figure of trends in employment concentration and income inequality in the U.S. appears most convincing in the period from 1950 to the late 1980s (see also Figure 7 in the published paper). It is especially interesting to observe the decline in employment concentration in the 1970s prior to the steep rise in inequality in the 1980s, as one would expect this lag in cause and effect. It is also widely assumed that the 1970s were a “pivotal decade” in terms of setting the stage for rising inequality.

But thereafter, the measure of employment concentration flattens out even though income inequality continues to rise, albeit less steeply than in the 1980s (note that the sharp increase in the early nineties is due to a change in the Census Bureau’s methods).

This latter period coincides with evidence of the declining significance of large firms in shaping the structure of wages and inequality. Matissa Hollister shows that the well-known wage premium accruing to workers in large firms declined from the late 1980s to the 1990s. And a paper she presented at the 2012 ASA meetings gives a new clue as to why: managers as a share of employment declined in large firms but rose in small firms, adding nuance to Adam Goldstein’s recent evidence in support of David Gordon’s Fat and Mean hypothesis.

In an earlier ASA paper, I explored the effect of establishment size on earnings inequality in a panel of urban areas from 1970 to 2000. I too found that the depressing effect of large establishments on aggregate levels of inequality ceased by 1990.  As noteworthy, average establishment size (as a measure of “downsizing”) declined in the 1980s but by just a small amount. It then increased (also by a small amount) in the 1990s. Similar evidence is provided by Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff.

Thus the decline of the large firm, at least by these definitions, is less consequential than the decline of what the large firm once stood for in terms of equity norms enforced by struggle (i.e., unions) and reinforced by a lack of competition. (And here I agree with Shamus Kahn that changes in constraints are likely more important than changes in norms.)

But you could argue that what we are really after are the practices of such firms, rather than their size or size distribution per se (though Jesper Sorensen and Olav Sorenson provide an elegant and persuasive theory of how the number and diversity of firms affects wage inequality). This is where Davis’ path breaking research is so crucial, and the published paper by Davis and Cobb fills in many of the blanks between Davis’s prior work on changes in corporate structure and rising economic inequality.

The next step is to operationalize some of these changes in corporate governance in finer detail. Take mergers and acquisitions, for example. Ola Sjoberg has already shown that they are correlated with cross-national variation in earnings inequality, even relative to a number of more common explanations (e.g., globalization). As I said at the outset, so much has changed over this period that isolating exactly which changes matter the most, and when, is the biggest challenge.

Finally, what I most look forward to reading from organizational sociologists are their ideas of how corporations can be reorganized to reduce market inequality. The prescriptive literature in economics, sociology, and political science speaks in near unison when it comes to the best and most viable solution to rising inequality in the U.S.: progressive taxes. The market is impossible to tame.

But my forthcoming book on public opinion about income inequality shows that Americans concerned about income inequality (and, yes, they are concerned) want less market inequality and more market opportunity. And they don’t necessarily see taxes as achieving either of those goals. There is a huge vacuum in public discourse, in other words, around the question of what the market institutions of the future can and should look like. Many are working on this question, but their collective voice is weak, and new and creative ideas are still desperately needed.

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Written by orgtheoryguest

October 22, 2012 at 3:52 am

9 Responses

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  1. Where exactly is that quote in Plutarch? My translation of Lives doesn’t have that phrase anywhere, though it’s possible it’s paraphrased. I have to admit I’m skeptical of the phrasing since Plutarch is generally supportive of inequality. For instance, in his life of Gaius Gracchus he generally takes the side of the optimates and indeed criticizes the senate for inadequacy in “opposing the common people” and going squishy “by gratifying and obliging them with such unreasonable things as otherwise they would have felt it honorable for them to incur the greatest unpopularity in resisting.”

    gabrielrossman

    October 22, 2012 at 5:05 am

  2. Leslie’s smart comments point to several areas for further investigation. It appears that the relation between corporate size and inequality in the US was most pronounced up until the late 1980s, and then things got a bit “de-coupled.” In presenting this work at an unnamed university to my south, I received great suggestions from Steve Lopez and Rachel Dwyer (among others) suggesting that the relation between corporate size and inequality was contingent on the particular labor relations regime in place. Prior to the Wagner Act, and after the shareholder value movement, the linkage between these two variables might be attenuated. It was uniquely within the “post-war blip” that corporate size and inequality were so closely linked.

    How to think about this? Bruno Amable’s variant of “varieties of capitalism” points out that within any economy there are institutions overseeing labor markets, product markets, capital markets, education, and social welfare provision. In combination, these institutions favor particular kinds of corporations and create distinctive linkages to inequality. Think of varieties of capitalism as analogous to sports: if you’re playing American football, then gaining yards is highly correlated with the score, while if you’re playing soccer the relation between these two is more muffled. Similarly, the connection between corporate structure and inequality depends on the variety of capitalism one is operating in. In the US, for several decades, these two were tightly linked; now, perhaps less so. This leaves room for much additional work clarifying how these things are connected within other economies. Did the US shift its “variety of capitalism” when shareholder value took over?

    @Gabriel: you real sociologists are way too high-brow for the internet. Please watch Gangnam Style a few more times.

    jerrydavisumich

    October 22, 2012 at 11:48 pm

  3. Iceland is so small I wonder if looking at the “Top 10″ employers might mean something very different.

    Wonks Anonymous

    October 23, 2012 at 5:10 pm

  4. @Wonks: Agreed, Iceland is a bit of an outlier, with a population of just 300,000. The employment data were from 2006, before the financial collapse, and at that point the big 3 Icelandic banks employed a very large part of the population. Today, not so much.

    jerrydavisumich

    October 23, 2012 at 9:35 pm

  5. “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics.”

    Maybe this is a reference to the fact that you need a sufficient number of plebs in order for the rich to enjoy the luxuries they deserve? :)

    On a serious note, I suppose an interesting question related to the role of shareholder value capitalism would be to track its diffusion to Europe and possible correlation with income inequality. There is definitely a shifting set of social norms in Finland: previously a profitable company could not legitimately lay off hundreds of people, now it only raises a few eyebrows.

    henri

    October 24, 2012 at 6:02 am

  6. Our website is officially up and running. Unfortunately, I wrote the wrong address in my post: http://worldinequality.org/

    @henri — This is one of the directions we are planning to take our research. I agree with your intuition and am in the process of trying to test this hypothesis. I have some longitudinal data from a few European countries coming in and have plans to get it cleaned up and analyzed soon. I can say that the pattern over time in the UK is strikingly similar to that of the US. Given they are both liberal market economies, this is not that surprising. I am curious to see how financialization has affected countries with other varieties of capitalism. Hopefully, I’ll know soon!

    Jason Heyes and colleagues published a nice paper earlier this year, “Varieties of capitalism, neoliberalism and the economic crisis of 2008-?”, in which they raise the critique of the existing varieties of capitalism literature for failing to account for the rise of finance as a disruptive force across European countries with different capitalist forms.

    jadamcobb

    October 24, 2012 at 7:52 pm

  7. I find it interesting that VoC is entering the management literature after a decade and half of intensive research in political science primarily. I’m a long-term skeptic on its ability to explain dynamics -a point Charles Ragin and I published in an article “Exploring complexity when diversity is limited: institutional complementarity”, European Management Review , which indicated that VoC often comes down to the difference in the preponderance of the equity market -that is financial institutions as coded by VoC.

    As to their general thesis, it might well be that the increasing productivity in advanced economies led to smaller corporations when measured by workers (though larger when measured by revenues). And top management is, I infer, capturing then a big share -though whether this is a constant share of a bigger pie or a proportionally bigger share is not clear from Adam’s and Jerry’s comments). But I suppose I would like to make sure that their ducks are lined up with the emerging facts and (these ducks -to mess up the metaphor) are attentive to data problems (such as sampling on public firms and missing the cross-country variation in private/public shares), before and after tax measurements of income) and to stylized facts showing some cross-country patterns that deserve comment. These patterns are the increasing share of the 1%, or .1% more accurately, in driving income inequality and the differences in sectoral explanations. The primary sectoral difference among some countries is that the growth of finance seems to be the explanation in France and the UK but not in the US -whose inequality is a true outlier among advanced economies). The gravity explained by the .1% means that the overall gini measurement is not necessarily a good measure of these changes at the top of the distribution.

    The point made by Jerry and I, as well as by Shamus Khan, is that income inequality is no longer about classes, it is about elites.

    I would be curious to know how to handle this problem. The UK and the US are both typed as liberal market economies (LME) in VoC. The UK has an advanced public universal health program, the US has not until recently and still will leave some without insurance and relies upon places of employment as contributors. Up until recently, the big public corporation in the US provided health (and pension) plans. VoC coding: UK and US are LME; public welfare systems remarkably different and would have to be added as some kind of intermediary variable. Dependent variable is US unusually high income inequality, UK high but substantially less.

    Before Jerry runs to Stata, one technical observation: since the VoC is about institutional complementarities, the institutional variables are not linear in their effects -our standard regression format needs to be tweaked by design or by econometric finesse or replaced by, say, a Ragin QCA type of analysis.

    But still, my prediction will be the public welfare systems, which is not an institutional variable in VoC, is going to intermediate big time after tax variations in inequality. And whether these welfare systems are financed by state revenues or the large corporation is thus going to have to be a big part of what we might want to think about regarding the big firm and inequality too.

    Bruce Kogut

    October 27, 2012 at 7:01 am

  8. @Bruce: thanks for the comments. A Stata-free response: I think we agree that the variant of varieties of capitalism that imagines economic systems as a continuum from market-based (the US) to coordinated (Germany) is not going to give us a lot of traction on this question. I’m much more persuaded by Amable’s version, which does include public welfare systems as one of its five institutional variables (along with education, capital markets, labor markets, and product markets). So, the link between inequality and corporate structure is going to depend on the particular configuration one has (just as the link between yards gained and score depends on whether you’re playing American football or soccer).

    How to get dynamics into this? I would argue that the shift from managerial capitalism to shareholder capitalism in the US during the 1980s was a “configural shift” that altered the complementarities among these things. Financial markets were relatively weak; education, public welfare, and labor markets were largely oriented around large and stable corporations (which provided long-term employment, welfare benefits, and incentives to invest in firm-specific “human capital”). When finance gained the upper hand, it altered the rest of this configuration: corporations did not offer long term employment, cut back on social welfare provision, and altered the incentives for different kinds of education.

    As for the 1% vs. 0.1%: our data for the US use the Current Population Survey, which is top-coded on income, so we don’t get Stephen Schwarzman in our Gini calculation (or anyone with an endowed chair named after them at Columbia). So, our numbers are about classes and not elites.

    jerrydavisumich

    October 28, 2012 at 8:24 pm

  9. [...] and final post in a blog forum about inequality and organizational theory (see parts 1, 2, and 3). Michael Piore of MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the Department of Economics wrote the [...]


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