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why nuclear weapons work as a deterrent

There’s an interesting post at Econlog that mentions Kruschev’s aversion to war, especially after he lost his own son in WWII. The discussion turned to the issue of deterrence and atomic bombs. The interesting observation is that most conventional weapons do not deter wars. The trenches, machine guns, and poison gas of WWI didn’t really make people think twice about WWII, which brought even more destruction. The threat of *millions* of deaths doesn’t make people back down, so why did nuclear weapons, specifically, seem to lead to less overall conflict between major powers?

My theory is psychological. War making is tied to an over estimation of one’s own abilities and an under estimation of the enemy. People think “my weapons are so great, and my enemies are so lame.” Even if the enemy is overwhelming, many people still resort to a vast over estimation of their own chances at survival. Hitler famously thought of some last ditch plans, even as the Soviets were shelling Berlin. The Emperor of Japan was willing to let the Japanese people suffer a million casualties as they tried to repel an inevitable American invasion. In other words, most wars allow both sides to invent a self-deceptive story of victory, even in the midst of obvious defeat.

So why nukes? Well, my theory is that it is the only weapon that effectively destroys this long shot hope with all certainty. Nuclear weapons instantaneously destroy cities and post-1945 weapons will leave decades of poisonous radiation. And there is no way to effectively prevent this. Even a Star Wars style shield won’t stop thousands of warheads, or a notorious “suitcase” nuke.There is no heroic last ditch effort in nuclear war. It’s outcome is immediate and obvious.

It’s sad, though, when the moral boundary between trench warfare and nuclear warfare is merely the speed of the carnage.

Written by fabiorojas

May 20, 2011 at 4:25 am

One Response

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  1. Uhhh, there are many problems with the observations here, but one of them is that nuclear deterrence cannot explain the decline in major war. The author of the book being discussed at Econlag, Mueller, wrote other books about the waning of major war where he specifically argues against the role of nuclear deterrence. For one thing, there have been no wars between major powers when only one or neither of them have nuclear weapons. Plus, there was a war between nuclear armed states, India and Pakistan, in 1999.

    And WWI DID make many people think twice about war. Look at the League of Nations, the Washington Conference, the rise of peace advocacy groups, and the extreme reluctance to use force to stand up to Hitler, even when it eventually became obvious what he was up to.

    Your last-ditch plans phenomenon is discussed in Hein Goeman’s book War and Punishment where he theorizes a ‘gambling for resurrection’ motivation – riskier behavior is rational when it might lead to a large payoff and your other option is getting killed for failure.

    As for war causation in general, dominant theories do include a form of mutual optimism (asymmetric information with incentives to misrepresent private information) but also point to commitment problems and indivisibility of the stakes. Start with James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 1995.

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    Talleyrand

    May 24, 2011 at 2:38 pm


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