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hospital organization: a few comments

As part of my RWJ research, I’ve been thinking a lot about patient safety. One example that sticks with me is from Peter Pronovosts and Eric Vohr’s book on patient safety, Safe Patients, Smart Hospitals. In one incident, he recalls that a patient undergoing surgery developed a latex allergy, which means that patient reacts badly to the surgeon’s gloves. Pronovost was the anesthesiologist and recommended that the surgeon change to non-latex gloves. The surgeon refused and the patient continued to have a reaction. If the surgeon did not immediately change gloves, the patient’s allergic reaction would escalate and the patient would die. Flummoxed by the surgeon’s refusal to change gloves, Pronovost tries to reason with him – changing gloves is a cheap and easy thing to do.  If he’s wrong, then nothing is lost. The patient is already having a reaction to something. If he’s right, the patient won’t die. The surgeon refused to change gloves. Pronovost only won when he threatened to call the hospital administration and disrupt the surgery. The surgeon relented, changed gloves, and the patient completed the procedure without any more problems.

This got me thinking: what kind of organization allows it employees to routinely ignore experts and others with “on the ground” knowledge? The answer: hospitals. Pronovost reports on something that is very common in medical practice: attending physicians and surgeons are encouraged to take a highly antagonistic stance toward subordinates. Nurses, medical students, residents, and even other lower ranked surgeons rarely are allowed to add their views on a particular patient or case. Many hospital employees live in fear of the surgeons and physicians they help. It’s not limited to the top of the chain. Even junior nurses live in fear of senior nurses. This isn’t a huge secret, and it’s been written about before, but I’m glad Pronovost is making a serious effort to link this toxic culture to patient safety.

On a deeper level, what sort of organization would allow people to develop such toxic relationships? I don’t have a complete answer, but I think some of it has to do with a combination of high professional autonomy and a garbage can structure. Hospitals, as far as I can tell, aren’t organizations that make one product with a centrally controlled assembly line. Instead, they are a place were “problems” (patients) drift from place to place  (ICU, regular, OR, etc) where they might be “solved” (stop showing symptoms) by some random assortment of people who have limited attention (the physicians, nurses, and surgeons). Each physician isn’t in charge of a patient, they do specific procedures and pass the problem along to other people.

Combine that with extreme professional autonomy and you get toxic culture. Each person has a small domain and limited time, but they have little connection to each other and a lot of stress. It’s litte surprise that toxic culture emerges since people are loosely connected and no superiors who monitor them.

Written by fabiorojas

April 8, 2010 at 5:07 am

9 Responses

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  1. Agreed on the professional autonomy point. But some organizations are “worse” than others. In the research I am doing on physician organizations, a lot of the focus right now is on accountable care organizations – structures that provide policy guidance, resources, and perhaps even contribute towards quality-oriented and patient-centered cultures. Also, though not hierarchically dominant as many ACOs are, strategic alliances and other network connections have also been shown to explain a good deal of the difference between hospitals’ administrative policies (i.e., Westphal, Gulati and Shortell (1997)).

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    sean mcclellan

    April 8, 2010 at 6:59 am

  2. Really interesting question…when I think of these kinds of toxic relationships in organizations, my mind always comes back to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City is a good piece of reportage that, in scene after scene, displays local/on the ground knowledge being eschewed–even when ignoring it forces the organization to incur serious costs.

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    fausto majistral

    April 8, 2010 at 3:35 pm

  3. @ sean: Very true. I wonder if there is an underlying explanation of how to mitigate toxic hospital culture.

    @ fausto: I’ll look into that.

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    Fabio

    April 8, 2010 at 8:14 pm

  4. Interesting post Fabio! It got me wondering about why someone might ignore this type of input. What about the role of professional identity or logics? I am not much of an expert on the area but…maybe in organisations where professional identity (e.g. surgeon) has traditionally been tightly coupled with the power/responsibility to make problem specific “decisions” (to cut or not to cut) the deference required to let others be seen to participate in the decision making process would constitute too great a status risk?

    If so, then in order to change this situation one needs to change the way professional identity, decision making authority, personal accountability and status were tied together within the organisation. Which would then explain why it’s so difficult.

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    Sam

    April 8, 2010 at 11:27 pm

  5. In _The Checklist Manifesto_, Gawande discusses a case where a hospital developed a pre-surgery checklist intended guide surgeon behavior to decrease infections, but it didn’t take — until, that is, the hospital specifically singled out the surgical nurses as not only responsible for executing the checklist, but explicitly empowered to speak up to the docs during procedures. When the nurses were specifically empowered over that domain and could call the surgeons on skipping steps, the infection rate decreased dramatically. To Sam’s point, Gawande does note the potential concern on the part of the docs that the checklists routinize their work, and this could have a deleterious effect on their professional status. Perhaps other elements of the same system helped to institute the new process while maintaining authority.

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    Alan

    April 9, 2010 at 12:40 am

  6. Universities seem like another kind of organization that fits Fabio’s profile. Think of the struggles between administrators and professors over assessment or the direction of the university, between senior professors and junior professors over “what’s best” for the students or the dept./program, among depts. over resources, etc.

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    katherinechen

    April 9, 2010 at 2:15 pm

  7. interesting example from Gawande. I really must read that book, it keeps popping up. Thanks for the tip Alan!

    Another example to add to the list of organisations fitting Fabio’s profile is mining firms (at least historically). The empirical work in my PhD is focused on a case study of one of the world’s largest coal exporters (which is a division of a MNE miner). Although the topic is rather unrelated to my PhD, in the field I’ve been told a lot of stories about the way safety used to be dealt with and how this has changed (for the better).

    However it used to be common for some employees to ignore experts and others with “on the ground” knowledge (e.g. underground crews) regarding safety. It took a lot of investment to change this and ensure everyone had the right (and responsibility) to ask about safety (and be listened to). The process to change this largely fitted within my above comments. Making this change has had huge consequences, for one, a lot less people get injured or die in Australia coal mines these days.

    Peter Madsen provides a nice macro view of the consequences of such micro initiatives (in the US coal industry) in his recent org. sci. article: http://orgsci.journal.informs.org/cgi/content/abstract/20/5/861

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    Sam

    April 9, 2010 at 9:53 pm

  8. Since I mentioned this entry in a comment at The Operations Room… Marty Lariviere discusses hospital errors from an operations point of view. I should resist but … sometimes I see many connection points between organizational sociology and operations, except that the latter is more prescriptive.

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    Patricia Ledesma

    April 12, 2010 at 7:06 pm

  9. Majority of what is said above is true, however the solution is not necessarily more supervision by superiors. Many of the superiors belong to the same “toxic” organization and are unlikely to posses the skills necessary to make effective, long lasting changes that benefit patients. Moreover, an assembly line production may not work to improve hospital organization. What works for General Motors may not work in a hospital setting and the government may not offer a bail out.

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    Rubin

    April 25, 2010 at 7:59 pm


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